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533 
COMMENT 
Admissions Online: Statements of a Party Opponent in the 
Internet Age 
I. Introduction 
Returning home from a party, Susan drove her car through a red light 
and collided with John’s pickup. John suffered severe injuries. After the 
accident, Susan went home and posted a status update on her Facebook 
page. In the post she briefly described what happened in the wreck, 
including the statement: “I knew I shouldn’t have driven, I had too much 
wine!” In the comments section following Susan’s post, her friend Jane 
responded, “Wow! You better get a good lawyer!” After reading Jane’s 
post, Susan clicked a thumbs-up icon, indicating she “liked” Jane’s 
comment. Several of Susan’s friends, including Steve, a mutual friend of 
accident victim John, read the posts. 
John subsequently brought a civil suit against Susan, and designated 
Steve as a trial witness who would testify regarding the posts on Susan’s 
Facebook page. Specifically, John wants Steve to testify that Susan 
admitted she had too much to drink prior to the accident, his goal being to 
prove that Susan in fact was intoxicated at the time of the wreck. John also 
wants Steve to testify about Susan’s “liking” of Jane’s comment to show 
that defendant Susan thought she needed a lawyer due to her actions. 
Susan objects to the admission of Steve’s testimony, invoking the 
hearsay rule.1 According to Susan, John cannot use her out-of-court 
statement for its truth in litigation. John argues that Susan’s post about 
drinking is an admissible non-hearsay statement of an opposing party 
because it was Susan’s own statement.2 He also argues that Susan’s “liking” 
of Jane’s comment shows Susan approved the comment and thus Jane’s 
words are admissible as the adopted statement of Susan.3 
This hypothetical situation demonstrates the impact of the Internet on the 
admissibility of evidence, particularly in the context of hearsay. The 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) generally exclude out-of-court statements 
if offered for their truth,4 but FRE 801(d)(2) provides a method for 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 2. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) (designating statements of a party, offered against that 
party, as non-hearsay). 
 3. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(B) (designating statements that a party has manifested 
adoption or belief in, when offered against that party, to be non-hearsay). 
 4. Id. Rule 802. 
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introducing such statements if made by an opposing party.5 In the above 
hypothetical, John wants to demonstrate that the accident was caused by 
Susan’s intoxication through evidence of her online statements. Having 
read the posts, Steve has the requisite personal knowledge needed to 
establish his competency as a witness.6 However, in order for Steve to 
testify to the statements contained in the Facebook posts, John has to 
overcome the general hearsay exclusion. Susan’s Facebook post was 
certainly made outside the courtroom, and John wants Steve to testify about 
that out-of-court statement. Because Susan is an opposing party in the 
litigation, FRE 801(d)(2) provides grounds for John to bring in certain out-
of-court statements that would generally be excluded, but that rule provides 
no explicit guidance on its application to online activity.7 The relatively 
recent emergence of the Internet as an avenue of communication8 raises 
new evidentiary questions. Are Facebook posts “statements” as defined 
under the FRE? Does “liking” someone else’s post sufficiently indicate 
adoption of the substance of the post? If one hosts a document on one’s 
website, does that person “manifest” a belief in the truth of the words 
contained therein? 
As new forms of Internet communication become more popular, 
answering these questions becomes more difficult. Technological 
innovation has led to new sources of out-of-court statements, making this 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. Rule 801(d)(2). 
 6. See id. Rule 602. 
 7. See id. Rule 801(d)(2). 
 8. While the Internet has been in existence since approximately 1991, recent 
developments have changed the way individuals interact with the Web. See Lev Grossman, 
You—Yes, You—Are TIME’s Person of the Year, TIME (Dec. 25, 2006), http://www.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html. As one commentator noted, changes in 
the Internet, referred to as “Web 2.0,” have turned the Web into a “massive social 
experiment” where individuals have the ability to contribute in new ways to society. Id. 
“[T]he essential difference between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 is that content creators were few 
in Web 1.0 with the vast majority of users simply acting as consumers of content,” while 
Web 2.0 allows anyone to create, thus democratizing online commentary. GRAHAM 
CORMODE & BALACHANDER KRISHNAMURTHY, AT&T LABS-RESEARCH, KEY DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN WEB 1.0 AND WEB 2.0, at 2 (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www2.research.att.com/~bala/ 
papers/web1v2.pdf. These changes are not truly technological; they relate to the 
“participatory nature of how a website’s content is created and delivered.” Seth P. Berman, 
Lam D. Nguyen & Julie S. Chrzan, Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between “Friends”?, 53 BOS. 
B.J. 5, 5 (2009). Web 2.0 allows users to interact and create content, as well as share 
information. Id. With virtually every individual possessing the capability to make online 
statements, the implications of the Internet’s effect on electronic evidence are certainly 
increasing. 
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type of evidence increasingly important in litigation.9 Because individuals 
are not likely to make online statements from the witness stand—at least 
not anytime soon—the hearsay rule is of particular import in this context.10 
Indeed, “[g]iven the near universal use of electronic means of 
communication,” courts have often applied FRE 801(d)(2) to electronic 
evidence.11 
This comment analyzes the application of FRE 801(d)(2) to online 
situations in order to illustrate sources of uncertainty and identify possible 
solutions. The rapidly increasing use of the Internet,12 along with the 
importance of electronic evidence in litigation,13 requires an examination 
into the FRE’s applicability to the online world. Part II outlines the 
operation of the hearsay rule and illustrates the traditional application of 
FRE 801(d)(2). Part III introduces new issues in application of the hearsay 
rule and FRE 801(d)(2) brought about by the Internet, and how case law has 
developed in response. Part IV evaluates possible solutions to resolve the 
uncertainties regarding the hearsay rule and the Internet. Finally, Part V 
concludes that applying the existing FRE will provide the most satisfactory 
solution to the issues presented by developing Internet technologies. 
II. The Operation of the Hearsay Rule, the Policy Behind It, and the 
Traditional Application of FRE 801(d)(2) 
A. The Hearsay Rule, Its Applicability to Online Situations, and Its Policy 
The FRE define hearsay as any “statement that: (1) the declarant does 
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party 
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement.”14 The FRE define a declarant as “the person who made the 
statement,” and a statement as “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, 
or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.”15 In general, 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence 
to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored Information in Civil Litigation, 50 
JURIMETRICS J. 147, 148 (2010). 
 10. Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 42 
(2009) (“[E]lectronic evidence clearly originates out-of-court . . . .”). 
 11. Jonathan D. Frieden & Leigh M. Murray, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, ¶ 52 (2010) (quoting 
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 568 (D. Md. 2007)). 
 12. See infra Part IV.A. 
 13. See Moore, supra note 9, at 148. 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 15. Id. Rule 801(a)-(b). 
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hearsay statements are not admissible into evidence under the FRE.16 The 
hearsay rule, while generally exclusionary, admits certain out-of-court 
statements, provided they qualify under an exception in the FRE, are 
permitted by other legislative or constitutional rules, or are declared not to 
be hearsay by legislative enactment.17 
Evaluation of online hearsay necessarily involves the consideration of 
electronically stored information (ESI).18 The FRE have been held to 
govern the admissibility of ESI in the same way they govern other forms of 
evidence.19 While the FRE do not identify electronic evidence as a specific 
category, the rules are constructed to “address technical changes not in 
existence as of the codification of the rules themselves.”20 Despite 
uncertainty surrounding how the FRE apply to online hearsay, it is clear 
they still control in this context.21 Thus, it is important to consider 
traditional hearsay principles. 
The general bar against hearsay is motivated by concerns for witness 
credibility, particularly with regard to four risks inherent in testimony: the 
declarant’s capacity to perceive accurately, inadequate memory, ambiguity, 
and fabrication.22 When testimony is given in court, these risks are 
addressed in part because the statements are made under oath or 
affirmation, because the fact-finder may observe the demeanor of the 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. Rule 802. 
 17. Id.; see id. Rule 801(d). 
 18. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 n.5 (D. Md. 2007). As the 
advisory committee notes to the 2006 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) indicate, “[t]he wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity 
of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of electronically 
stored information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s notes. FRCP 34(a), which 
was amended in 2006 to explicitly authorize discovery of ESI, is intended to be interpreted 
expansively and identifies “writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound 
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which 
information can be obtained,” as discoverable ESI. Id. Rule 34(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); 
see also Argus & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Benefits Servs., Inc., No. 08-10531, 2009 WL 
1297374, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2009) (describing information stored on a claims 
processing website as “clearly . . . within the definition of electronically stored 
information”); Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 447-48 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(holding information stored in a computer’s random access memory was discoverable ESI). 
 19. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538 n.5 (citation omitted). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Cf. PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 403 (2d ed. 2008) 
(noting that the application of the hearsay rule does not differ when applied to electronic 
evidence, but is “made more difficult to apply because of the new context”). 
 22. 6 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801:1 (7th ed. 2012). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/5
2013]       COMMENT 537 
 
 
speaker, and, most importantly, because the opposing party has an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.23 While the credibility risks are 
still present during in-court testimony, out-of-court statements increase 
those risks “because an out-of-court declarant is not subject to the reliability 
safeguards present with in-court testimony.”24 Thus, the hearsay rule 
generally excludes out-of-court statements to eliminate the risk of 
inaccurate, misleading, or false testimony.25 
B. Traditional Application of FRE 801(d)(2) and Its Justification 
1. FRE 801(d)(2): Admitting Statements of Opposing Parties as Non-
Hearsay 
The FRE provide exceptions to the hearsay rule for certain types of 
statements.26 The advisory committee notes to FRE 803 indicate that certain 
hearsay statements have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that 
negate the risk of using out-of-court statements for their truth.27 FRE 804 
outlines other exceptions to the hearsay rule for situations where a declarant 
is unavailable.28 The advisory committee justified the exceptions because, 
where a declarant is unavailable to testify in court, hearsay evidence 
meeting a specified standard is better than no evidence at all.29 
When considering the impact of the Internet on the hearsay rule, FRE 
801(d)(2) is of particular relevance.30 The rule admits the relevant 
statements of a party in litigation when used against that party by an 
opponent.31 FRE 801(d)(2) does not outline exceptions to the hearsay rule, 
but defines a party’s out-of-court statements as “not hearsay.”32 However, 
those same types of statements, if offered for their truth, fit under the 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. Cross-examination is “the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery 
of truth.’” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 
1367 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 24. Moore, supra note 9, at 166. 
 25. See id. at 166-67. 
 26. See FED. R. EVID. 803-804. 
 27. Id. Rule 803 advisory committee’s notes. 
 28. See id. Rule 804. 
 29. Id. Rule 804 advisory committee’s notes. 
 30. See Frieden & Murray, supra note 11, ¶ 52. 
 31. 6 GRAHAM, supra note 22, § 801:15. 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
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general hearsay definition of FRE 801(c).33 This is in contrast to FRE 803 
and FRE 804, which are both classified as exceptions to the hearsay rule in 
their titles.34 Some have argued that FRE 801(d)’s phrasing is confusing 
and inappropriate.35 The words “not hearsay” as used in the context of FRE 
801(d)(2) do not carry their usual meaning; any out-of-court statement 
offered for its truth is hearsay under FRE 801(c).36 The term as used in Rule 
801(d) simply excludes “statements which would otherwise literally fall 
within the definition” of hearsay from that definition under the FRE.37 
Thus, the rule has the practical effect of the hearsay exceptions enumerated 
in FRE 803 and FRE 804, but remains difficult to classify.38 
The traditional application of FRE 801(d)(2) highlights areas where 
controversy may arise in cases of online admissions. Prior to evaluating the 
admissibility of online admissions for hearsay purposes, it is important to 
consider the relevance of the proffered evidence.39 “Evidence is relevant if: 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining 
the action.”40 In addition to the requirement of relevancy, the evidence must 
also be authenticated as required by FRE 901(a): “To satisfy the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See id. Rule 801(c); Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay” 
Classification: The Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2011). 
 34. See FED. R. EVID. 803-804. 
 35. See generally Stonefield, supra note 33 (outlining the history of Rule 801(d) and 
advocating for amendment). “By labeling this admittedly hearsay evidence as something that 
it is not, Rule 801(d) creates an oxymoron.” Id. at 2. While Professor Stonefield’s comments 
are from before the 2011 “restyling” amendments to the FRE were enacted, his opinions 
regarding FRE 801(d)’s “not hearsay” phrasing remain relevant as this characterization 
survived in the amended rule. The primary change in rule 801(d)(2) was replacing the term 
“admission” with “statement.” The word was replaced in the current version under the 
reasoning that “[t]he term ‘admissions’ is confusing because not all statements covered by 
the exclusion are admissions in the colloquial sense—a statement can be within the 
exclusion even if it ‘admitted’ nothing and was not against the party’s interest when made.” 
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s notes. However, the advisory committee did not 
amend the “not hearsay” language. See id. Rule 801(d). 
 36. Stonefield, supra note 33, at 2; see FED. R. EVID. 801(c)-(d). 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee’s notes. 
 38. See Stonefield, supra note 33, at 51-52 (noting the United States Supreme Court has 
referred to the rule as an exemption, exception, and exclusion and has avoided the phrase 
“not hearsay”). 
 39. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (making irrelevant evidence inadmissible); see also United 
States v. Davis, 826 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D.R.I. 1993) (“The initial inquiry in any evidentiary 
determination of admissibility is whether the evidence is relevant.”). 
 40. FED. R. EVID. 401(a)-(b). 
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requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the 
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is.”41 In the context of statements of a 
party opponent, there must be evidence that the party who is alleged to have 
made the statement actually did so.42 Finally, determining the admissibility 
of an opposing party’s out-of-court statements requires careful 
consideration of the applicable hearsay rules. 
Per FRE 801(d)(2), statements are not hearsay when: 
 The statement is offered against an opposing party and: 
 (A) was made by the party in an individual or representative 
capacity; 
 (B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to 
be true; 
 (C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make 
a statement on the subject; 
 (D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter 
within the scope of that relationship and while it existed; or 
 (E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.43 
The text of FRE 801(d)(2) indicates that “there are specific foundational 
facts that must be established” in determining whether a non-hearsay 
statement exists.44 The trial judge determines the existence of these facts 
under FRE 104(a).45 First, there must be a statement as defined by FRE 
801(a), and that statement must have been made out of court.46 Second, the 
statement must be attributable to a party to the litigation as outlined in the 
five subparts of FRE 801(d)(2).47 Third, a “party’s out-of-court-statement 
must be offered against that party.”48 Finally, as with all out-of-court 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. Rule 901(a). 
 42. See id. Rule 801(d)(2). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 567 (D. Md. 2007). 
 45. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 46. See id. Rule 801(d)(2). 
 47. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(A)-(E). 
 48. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 567 (emphasis added). A party may not rely on Rule 
801(d)(2) to offer its own out-of-court statements into evidence. Rather, the rule permits one 
party to offer another party’s out-of-court statement against that party-declarant. Id. 
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statements, FRE 801(d)(2) is only implicated if the statement is “offer[ed] 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”49 
Unlike other hearsay exceptions, “No guarantee of trustworthiness is 
required in the case of an admission.”50 Because FRE 801(d)(2) concerns 
either a party’s own statement or a statement the rules attribute to him, a 
policy of fairness permits those statements to be used against that party: 
“Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of 
hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the 
adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay 
rule.”51 The advisory committee notes to the FRE endorse a “generous 
treatment of this avenue to admissibility.”52 Due to “a party’s ability to 
rebut the out-of-court statement by ‘put[ting] himself on the stand and 
explain[ing] his former assertion,’” this generous treatment is justified.53 
2. Application of FRE 801(d)(2) in the Non-Internet Context 
In United States v. Atlas Lederer Co., a Southern District of Ohio case 
arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act, the United States government sued to recover costs 
incurred in cleaning up pollution from a scrap company site.54 In the course 
of that litigation, the United States wished to enter into evidence statements 
by a defendant taken both from an affidavit and from answers to 
interrogatories during the discovery stage of the litigation.55 The defendant 
argued that the answers to the interrogatories and the affidavit statement 
could not be used against him, but the court held they were admissible non-
hearsay statements under FRE 801(d)(2)(A).56 Because a party made both 
                                                                                                                 
 49. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
 50. Id. Rule 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes. While this portion of the advisory 
committee’s notes still uses “admission” in connection with rule 801(d)(2), this word has 
been amended and replaced with “statement” in the text of the rule. See supra note 35. 
Because both the committee and courts were still using “admission” when discussing FRE 
801(d)(2) until late 2011, the term is featured in many of the sources quoted in this 
comment. It should be equated with the current phrasing, “[a]n [o]pposing [p]arty’s 
[s]tatement,” because the changes after the 2011 amendments were “intended to be stylistic 
only [with] no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” FED. R. 
EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes. 
 51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 116 (D.C. 2003) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. 1988)). 
 54. No. 3:91CV309, 2012 WL 89976, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2012). 
 55. Id. at *4. 
 56. Id. 
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statements, and because both statements were being offered against that 
party, the court applied FRE 801(d)(2) to admit them into evidence.57 
In Graves ex rel. W.A.G. v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Southern District of 
Mississippi disallowed admission of statements because the statements did 
not meet the standards of FRE 801(d)(2).58 In a products liability action 
arising from a vehicle accident that caused the plaintiff severe injuries, the 
plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude statements from a post-accident 
medical record that included his pre-accident medical history.59 The 
plaintiff contended that those statements were inadmissible hearsay because 
he had no recollection of the accident and, thus, the statements concerning 
his prior medical history must have come from someone else.60 The 
defendant corporation countered that the statements were admissible non-
hearsay statements of a party opponent because the plaintiff, or someone 
speaking on his behalf, must have outlined his medical history after the 
accident.61 The court was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument 
because the argument unjustly relied on an assumption that the statements 
were made by the plaintiff or his parents.62 The defendant did not offer 
sufficient evidence to establish any source of the statements, much less that 
the statements were made by the plaintiff or his parents, and the court 
refused to admit the hearsay under FRE 801(d)(2) without further evidence 
that the plaintiff was the declarant.63 
As the courts’ evidentiary rulings in Atlas Lederer Co. and Graves ex rel. 
W.A.G. show, establishing the declarant of a purported 801(d)(2) statement 
is an essential determination in applying the rule. Identification in this 
regard, along with the even more fundamental question of whether there has 
been a statement at all, becomes further complicated in light of 
technological change. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. 
 58. No. 2:09CV169KS-MTP, 2012 WL 73010, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012). 
 59. Id. at *1-3. 
 60. Id. at *1-2. 
 61. Id. at *3. 
 62. Id. (“[W]ithout more direct evidence of where this information came from, the court 
will not assume that it was provided by [the plaintiff].”). 
 63. Id. 
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III. New Issues in the Application of FRE 801(d)(2) Brought on by 
Developing Internet Technologies 
While the traditional operation of FRE 801(d)(2) seems well-settled, 
with “apparently prevalent satisfaction [in] the results,”64 changes in the 
type of evidence being generated have raised issues in the application of 
this rule. Defining the point at which online activity becomes a statement 
for hearsay purposes and the method of determining that point becomes 
important because of the effect those conclusions have on the admissibility 
of evidence at trial.65 As one court observed, “Hearsay issues are pervasive 
when electronically stored and generated evidence is introduced.”66 The 
“mechanical recording of data on a Web page on the Internet does not 
create hearsay,” but when an online statement “could be affected by the 
human problems of perception, memory, sincerity, and ambiguity,” the 
hearsay rule is implicated.67 If a statement is made online, by definition it 
was not made in court.68 Thus, if online statements are offered into 
evidence for their truth, the hearsay rule governs.69 Courts have had varied 
responses to the issues raised by electronic and online evidence. 
A. Courts’ Initial Reluctance to Accept Internet Evidence 
The Internet presents a “sizable bank of information, news, and other 
potentially valuable evidence to use in support of [a] case.”70 However, 
many courts initially questioned the reliability of online information.71 
One court addressed online evidence with what was later called “famous 
skepticism.”72 In an early opinion rejecting electronic “evidence,” the 
Southern District of Texas stated that “any evidence procured off the 
Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even under the most liberal 
interpretation of the hearsay exception rules.”73 In the case, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 64. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes. 
 65. See id. Rule 801(c) (hearsay governs “statements”). 
 66. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 562 (D. Md. 2007). 
 67. RICE, supra note 21, at 421. 
 68. See United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 69. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 70. Theodore J. Koerth & Christopher E. Paetsch, How to Admit E-Mail and Web Pages 
into Evidence, 94 ILL. B.J. 674, 675 (2006). 
 71. Id. at 676; see Jackson, 208 F.3d at 637; St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, 
Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
 72. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007) (citing St. 
Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 774-75). 
 73. St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 775. It may be relevant to note that this opinion was 
rendered by Samuel B. Kent, who has since resigned his federal judgeship following a 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/5
2013]       COMMENT 543 
 
 
addressed a plaintiff’s claim that he suffered injury on a ship allegedly 
owned by the defendant.74 The defendant disputed ownership of the vessel 
and the plaintiff sought to prove ownership through evidence obtained on 
the United States Coast Guard’s Internet database; the court found this 
evidence “totally insufficient” to successfully counter a motion to dismiss.75 
The court presumed Internet information to be inherently untrustworthy 
because “[a]nyone can put anything on the Internet” and “[n]o web-site is 
monitored for accuracy.”76 In addition, the court viewed the Internet “as one 
large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinformation,” without sufficient 
indicia of authenticity.77 The court pointed out that any individual with 
sufficient technological skill could alter online evidence remotely.78 
In another early case dealing with Internet evidence, the Seventh Circuit 
also rejected the admissibility of online statements as hearsay.79 In United 
States v. Jackson, the defendant appealed several criminal convictions and 
argued that the trial court erred by excluding web postings of white 
supremacist groups claiming responsibility for the crimes.80 The proponent 
argued that the postings were business records of the Internet service 
provider and thus admissible under FRE 803(6).81 The Seventh Circuit, 
however, found the web postings to be inadmissible hearsay because the 
business record exception did not apply and the postings’ authenticity was 
not sufficiently established.82 
                                                                                                                 
sexual abuse scandal that led to his imprisonment and the rare initiation of impeachment 
proceedings in Congress. See Martha Neil, Federal Judge Samuel Kent Resigns, as Senate 
Impeachment Trial Looms, A.B.A. J. (June 25, 2009, 5:05 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/federal_judge_samuel_kent_resigns_as_senate_impeachment_trial_looms/; 
Stewart Powell, Judge Kent’s Impeachment Came Fast and Furious, HOUS. CHRON. (June 
19, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Judge-Kent-s-impeachment-
came-fast-and-furious-1729616.php. 
 74. St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 774-75. 
 77. Id. at 774. 
 78. Id. at 775. 
 79. United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 80. Id. at 637. 
 81. Id. at 637-38. 
 82. Id. (citing St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 775). The proponent of the postings argued 
that they were admissible as the business records of the Internet service provider, but the 
court pointed out that just because the service provider could reproduce the postings did not 
make them the service provider’s business records. Id. at 637. Further, regardless of the FRE 
803(6) analysis, the proponent failed to offer sufficient evidence of authenticity to satisfy 
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The initial reluctance shown by these courts towards Internet evidence 
has received scrutiny in recent years, notably by the District of Maine: “[I]n 
the decade since Jackson, the Internet has become more familiar and 
ubiquitous and its potential significance as a critical source for evidence in 
some cases has escalated. A conclusion that all Internet postings are so 
inherently unreliable that they are never admissible seems unwise.”83 The 
Cameron court criticized Jackson for its reliance on St. Claire: 
Although St. Clair still accurately describes some parts of the 
Internet, the on-line world has matured in the eleven years since 
that Court’s observation, and this Court is less inclined to paint 
all websites with the same broad brush and exclude all Internet 
postings from the business records exception to the hearsay rule 
only because they are Web-based.84 
Instead, the court advocated “periodic reevaluation” with reference to web-
based content and the hearsay rule.85 Cameron is indicative of courts’ 
increasing acceptance of Internet evidence. 
B. Proper Foundation: Courts’ Increasing Acceptance of Online Statements 
Under FRE 801(d)(2) 
Despite initial reluctance, recent cases dealing with the admissibility of 
Internet statements illustrate that courts are more willing to allow these 
statements into evidence.86 While courts have applied other exceptions to 
the hearsay rule to admit Internet statements,87 FRE 801(d)(2) is often 
considered when evaluating the admissibility of electronic evidence.88 In 
                                                                                                                 
FRE 901 because she did not show the postings were actually made by the white 
supremacist groups. Id. at 638. 
 83. United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160-61 (D. Me. 2011), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 84. Id. at 161. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Koerth & Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675-76 (citing U.S. EEOC v. E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 65 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 706, 708 (E.D. La. 2004); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (admitting 
chat room log printouts, focusing on authenticity); Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple 
Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (admitting emails under 
FRE 803(3) as statements of declarant’s then-existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition), aff’d, 238 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2001); State v. Erickstad, 2000 ND 202, ¶¶ 33-34, 
620 N.W. 2d 136, 145-46 (admitting online used car price guide under a market report or 
commercial publication exception to hearsay rule). 
 88. Frieden & Murray, supra note 11, ¶ 33. 
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light of the vast use of electronic communication, “[I]t is not surprising that 
statements contained in electronically made or stored evidence often have 
been found to qualify as admissions by a party opponent if offered against 
that party.”89 However, courts’ willingness to apply FRE 801(d)(2) has 
varied depending on the format of the electronic statements. 
1. Emails Authored by Parties Classified as Non-Hearsay Admissions 
The most “ubiquitous” form of electronic evidence considered by courts 
is email: “[E]-mail evidence often figures prominently in cases where state 
of mind, motive and intent must be proved, [and] it is not unusual to see a 
case consisting almost entirely of e-mail evidence.”90 While emails are 
“always subject to the limitations of the hearsay rule,”91 courts have often 
admitted this type of online statement as a statement of a party opponent.92 
In Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & 
Insurance Co., the District of Vermont classified emails of a party as non-
hearsay statements.93 In a suit by an insured party against its insurer to 
collect damages resulting from a defective product, the plaintiff objected to 
the defendant’s use of intra-company emails authored by the plaintiff’s 
employees.94 The court rejected the plaintiff’s hearsay objection, finding 
those statements were “clearly admissions of a party, and therefore 
admissible as non-hearsay.”95 The court’s reasoning was grounded in the 
fact that the emails were authored by the party and were being offered 
against that party.96 
The admissibility of emails was also challenged in Schaghticoke Tribal 
Nation v. Kempthorne, a case concerning whether the Schaghticoke Tribal 
Nation qualified as an Indian tribe under federal law.97 During a dispute 
over the extent of the case record on joint motions for summary judgment, 
the plaintiffs argued that certain emails should be considered.98 However, 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 568 (D. Md. 
2007)). 
 90. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 554 (citation omitted). 
 91. Bowe v. State, 785 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000); Koerth & 
Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675. 
 93. 72 F. Supp. 2d 441, 449 (D. Vt. 1999). 
 94. Id. at 448-49. 
 95. Id. at 449. 
 96. See id. at 448-49. 
 97. See 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 394, 398 (D. Conn. 2008), aff’d, 587 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
 98. Id. at 394-95, 398. 
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the District of Connecticut held that emails authored by a lobbying group 
opposing tribal designation were inadmissible hearsay because the group 
was not a party to the litigation and was not an agent of any party; thus, 
FRE 801(d)(2) did not apply.99 In contrast, emails from staff members of 
the government bodies being sued by the tribe were admissible under FRE 
801(d)(2)(D).100 Unlike the authors of the lobbying group emails, the 
staffers were employees of opposing parties and thus could speak on the 
opposing parties’ behalves.101 
Email evidence was also challenged in a fraud action prosecuted by a 
corporation’s shareholders against the corporation and its officers and 
directors.102 The defendant chief executive officer objected to the plaintiffs’ 
use of emails he authored as evidence.103 The emails in question were 
authenticated because the parties produced them during discovery.104 The 
Central District of California overruled the defendant’s argument because 
“emails written by a party are admissions of a party opponent and 
admissible as non-hearsay under [FRE] 801(d)(2).”105 Because the emails 
were written by the defendant and offered against him by the plaintiffs, they 
were admissible.106 However, the court determined other emails to be 
inadmissible, including where the email merely referenced the need to 
speak with a person identified by first name only, even though it was the 
defendant’s first name.107 While the reference to the defendant could be 
inferred, nothing in the record conclusively connected the email to the 
defendant, and FRE 801(d)(2) did not apply, as the email was not shown to 
be his statement or adopted statement.108 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., a copyright 
infringement case brought by record companies, movie studios, and music 
publishers against the distributor of file-sharing software, the defendant 
objected to the use of emails as evidence.109 Each email included the names 
of sender and recipient, as well as the date and time of sending.110 The 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. at 398. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 103. Id. at 781. 
 104. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 110. 
 105. In re Homestore.com, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 781. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. at 781-82. 
 108. See id. 
 109. 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970-71 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 110. Id. at 971. 
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emails came to light in the discovery process and were voluntarily 
submitted by the defendants; thus, the court found no problem with 
authenticity.111 The Central District of California admitted these emails as 
statements of an opposing party under FRE 801(d)(2).112 Because the 
defendant admitted to employing certain individuals, the court found all 
emails sent by those employees admissible as non-hearsay under FRE 
801(d)(2)(D).113 That subsection treats the statements of a “party’s agent or 
employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it 
existed,” as statements of the party.114 In addition, after the defendant 
admitted that the email address “info@musiccity.com” was a corporate 
email address, the court found “[a]ll emails sent from that address [to be] 
admissible non-hearsay” under FRE 801(d)(2).115 
Emails have also been admitted as adopted statements of a party.116 In 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., emails were also admitted as adoptive 
statements under FRE 801(d)(2)(B): “To the extent other content is 
incorporated into these emails, and to the extent the [defendant’s] agent 
expresses approval thereof, the incorporated content is admissible as 
vicarious adoptions.”117 
Ruling on an appeal from the district court’s ruling in a suit concerning a 
shipping contract dispute, the Ninth Circuit found an abuse of discretion in 
the exclusion of an email from evidence.118 An employee of the plaintiff 
authored the email in question, which implicated the plaintiff’s liability for 
a counterclaim arising out of a delayed railroad shipment, and a second 
employee subsequently forwarded it to the defendant.119 The Ninth Circuit 
found that the initial composition of the email was a statement by the 
plaintiff’s agent acting within the scope of employment and thus “not 
hearsay” under FRE 801(d)(2)(D).120 The court of appeals also found that 
the email was admissible as an adoptive admission based on the second 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 972; see John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 
2d 462, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that a party’s self-production of documents “implicitly 
authenticate[s]” them). 
 112. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74. 
 113. Id. at 971. 
 114. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). 
 115. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 974. 
 116. Koerth & Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675. 
 117. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (citing FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2)(B)). 
 118. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 119. Id. at 813, 821. 
 120. Id. at 821. 
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employee’s actions.121 The second employee copied the body of the original 
email “and prefaced it with the statement, ‘Yikes, Pls [sic] note the rail 
screwed us up . . . .,’” which the court found sufficient to manifest the 
second employee’s adoption or belief in the truth of the original email.122 
Additionally, United States v. Safavian, a federal criminal prosecution 
for obstruction of justice, involved the use of numerous emails as 
evidence.123 In response to the defendant’s objection on hearsay grounds, 
the court determined admissibility based on different categorizations of the 
emails.124 The court applied FRE 801(d)(2)(A) to admit the emails 
“attributed directly to [the defendant].”125 The court also found emails 
admissible when “[t]he context and content of certain e-mails 
demonstrate[d] clearly that [the defendant] ‘manifested an adoption or 
belief’ in the truth of the statements of other people” by forwarding them.126 
However, when the defendant forwarded other emails but did not “clearly 
demonstrate his adoption of the contents,” the district court did not find any 
adopted statements.127 
Emails typically fit neatly into the admissions doctrine.128 “[W]ritten 
assertion[s]” are inherent in the composition of emails, and that clearly 
makes emails “statements” under the FRE.129 Emails function much like a 
conversation between sender and recipient, clearly conveying the former’s 
statement in a manner that asserts a particular position.130 When considering 
adopted statements, the same logic holds true. If an individual relays 
another’s email without qualification or modification, it might be fair to 
find the forwarder to have “manifested that [the forwarder] adopted or 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 123. 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 124. See id. at 43. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (1997) (repealed 2011)); see supra notes 35, 
50. 
 127. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
 128. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 
966, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2006); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 
781 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 129. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 130. Goode, supra note 10, at 43 (“When someone writes an e-mail that asserts, ‘My 
supervisor ordered me to cancel the contract,’ that person has made a statement . . . . For 
analytical purposes, it is no different from a person handwriting or typing a letter that asserts 
the same thing.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/5
2013]       COMMENT 549 
 
 
believed [the original email] to be true.”131 On the other hand, forwarding 
an email without an expression of approval may be insufficient to indicate 
adoption.132 If the forwarder does not indicate any adoption and merely 
forwards the message, the intent may not be clear; he may simply be 
pointing out another’s position to the recipient. 
In these situations, courts should examine the facts on a case-by-case 
basis.133 To determine adoption, the court should “read each of the e-mails 
with care” and determine “the context in which [the emails] should be 
considered or who the senders or recipients were.”134 
2. Classifying Non-Email Online Statements 
While the admissions doctrine’s applicability to emails appears relatively 
clear, the analysis becomes less straightforward when addressing non-email 
online statements. Unlike emails, online statements like website postings do 
not always function as proxies for direct communication. A primary hurdle 
courts face in dealing with this type of evidence in the hearsay context 
involves determining whether there was a statement at all.135 The use of 
FRE 801(d)(2) in the non-email context is relevant because controversy 
over the admissibility of this type of evidence often arises in litigation.136 
In Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., the District of 
Oregon considered the admissibility of statements on the website of a 
defendant to a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violation.137 Plaintiffs, the 
alleged debtors, and defendants, a collection agency and the agency 
president, moved for partial summary judgment; the admissibility of 
statements contained on the agency’s website was at issue.138 The plaintiffs 
alleged the collection agency placed misrepresentations on its website in 
violation of federal law, and the defendants challenged the statements as 
inadmissible hearsay.139 As an initial matter, the court found the 
defendants’ website to contain “a wealth of misinformation” and, as such, 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 
F. Supp. 2d at 973 (noting FRE 801(d)(2)(B) permits “content created by individuals other 
than the creator of an email [that] is incorporated into the email,” to be admitted). 
 132. See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Id. at 43. 
 135. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007). 
 136. Id. at 555 (“Courts often have been faced with determining the admissibility of 
exhibits containing representations of the contents of website postings . . . .”). 
 137. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093, 1109 (D. Or. 2000). 
 138. Id. at 1094, 1109. 
 139. Id. at 1108-09. 
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to be relevant.140 The court ultimately found “the representations made by 
[the] defendants on the website [to be] admissible as admissions of the 
party-opponent under FRE 801(d)(2)(A)” because the defendants created 
the website and were opposing parties.141 
In deciding Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the Central 
District of California also applied the admissions doctrine to allow printouts 
from a third-party website to be admitted into evidence.142 In this copyright-
infringement case, the plaintiff sought to use online evidence to show that 
the defendants were affiliated with certain websites containing the alleged 
infringement.143 The plaintiff sought to admit into evidence printouts from a 
third-party website indicating that the defendants were associated with 
those websites, which were alleged to infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights.144 
The court found the printouts admissible for that purpose because they were 
non-hearsay statements of an opposing party.145 The court justified this 
finding under FRE 801(d)(2)(D),146 which admits statements “made by the 
party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship 
and while it existed.”147 Based on the reference to FRE 801(d)(2)(D), it 
seems the court concluded that statements on the third-party websites 
proved the existence of an agency or employment relationship between the 
defendant and the third parties, although this connection is not explicitly 
outlined in the opinion.148 
In TIP Systems, LLC v. SBC Operations, Inc., a patent infringement 
action, the Southern District of Texas admitted printouts from a party’s own 
website.149 Plaintiffs owned a patent for an inmate telephone and alleged 
that the defendants’ similar device infringed on their existing patent.150 To 
prove the defendants were infringing based on the presence of their product 
in the marketplace, plaintiffs wished to use statements from the defendant’s 
website to show the defendants were in the inmate telephone business.151 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. at 1109. 
 141. See id. 
 142. 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). 
 148. See Perfect 10, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. 
 149. 536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749, 756 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 150. Id. at 750-51. 
 151. Id. at 756. 
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Because the printouts contained statements made by a party on its own 
website, the court admitted them under FRE 801(d)(2).152 
Finally, United States v. Cameron included a discussion of the 
applicability of FRE 801(d)(2) to images of child pornography found on a 
criminal defendant’s computer.153 The court first concluded that possession 
of the images was a substantive element of the crime as opposed to 
evidence of it, thus negating any hearsay implications.154 The court then 
considered the merits of the defendant’s hearsay arguments.155 Although the 
discussion was not dispositive in the outcome of the appeal, the court 
illustrated the difficulties of applying FRE 801(d)(2) in online situations.156 
While the court stated that “the possession of these images could constitute 
an admission by the Defendant of the commission of the crime of 
possession of child pornography,” it also acknowledged uncertainty as to 
whether the images were “statements” at all. 157 In a footnote, the court 
again pointed out the “considerable uncertainty that surrounds how to apply 
the rules of evidence to Web-based postings.”158 This discussion sheds light 
on the difficulties courts face concerning the hearsay rule, FRE 801(d)(2), 
and new Internet forms of communication. 
A major distinction between emails and websites is that while emails 
typically embody clear “written assertion[s],”159 the composition of a 
website is not always an obvious assertion as required by FRE 801(a).160 
Courts have generally accepted that emails contain statements.161 However, 
as the court pointed out in Cameron, classifying online content under the 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See id. at 756 n.5. 
 153. 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D. Me. 2011) (focusing on the testimonial nature of 
reports submitted to tip-off the Internet service provider regarding defendant’s suspected 
child pornography activity in the context of the Confrontation Clause), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 669 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 154. Id. at 158-60. 
 155. See id. at 159-62. 
 156. See id. at 162. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. at 162 n.6. 
 159. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 160. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007) (“Cases 
involving electronic evidence often raise the issue of whether electronic writings constitute 
‘statements’ under Rule 801(a).”). 
 161. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 
2002); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973-74 
(C.D. Cal. 2006); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2006); 
Koerth & Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675. 
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existing rules is more difficult.162 This ambiguity increases when 
considering content generated on social networking sites.163 
3. Lack of a Clear Rule for Internet Hearsay and Social Networking 
Large portions of the population regularly use social networking 
websites.164 These types of online portals “are effective for facilitating 
communication, conveying autobiographical information, and 
consequently, collecting evidence.”165 Despite the sites’ wide use, “federal 
case law regarding the admissibility of social networking web sites is 
limited,” and no clear rule has emerged regarding this type of electronic 
evidence.166 Courts addressing social networking sites have been skeptical, 
in part due to hearsay concerns.167 
Content on social networking sites differs from that of emails or 
traditional website postings.168 The primary distinction between these types 
of online statements can be found in the directness of the communication. 
On a spectrum between communications limited in scope and those with 
unlimited reach, emails fall more in line with the former. Emails represent 
direct communications from senders, who “generally know with whom they 
are communicating” because senders address messages to exclusive lists of 
recipients.169 Traditional websites occupy the opposite end of the spectrum 
because they are widely viewable by anyone with Internet access. To access 
a traditional website, “[a] user may either type the address of a known page 
or enter one or more keywords into a commercial ‘search engine’ in an 
effort to locate sites.”170 
Social networking posts fall somewhere between emails and traditional 
websites on this spectrum: “Social networking sites and blogs are 
sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily provides 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 162 n.6. 
 163. See Kathrine Minotti, The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of Social 
Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057, 1060-61 (2009). 
 164. See infra Part IV.A. 
 165. Minotti, supra note 163, at 1058. 
 166. Id. at 1066. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices 
for Utilities Engaging Social Media, 32 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (“[S]ocial media is a catch 
phrase that describes technology that facilitates interactive information, user-created content 
and collaboration.”). 
 169. See Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 436-37 (Md. 2009). 
 170. Id. at 436 n.1 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852-53 (1997)). 
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information that the user wants to share with others.”171 Users can choose 
who, among other users, has access to their postings. However, the average 
Facebook user has 120 “friends” who have access to his postings.172 While 
a social networking profile is not typically viewable to the world like a 
traditional website, the number of people with access to postings is far 
greater than the typically limited recipients of an email. 
The unique type and scope of communications on social networking sites 
make these communications distinguishable from emails and website 
postings. Approaches taken by courts to determine admissibility of hearsay 
on websites or in emails are not easily applied to social networking, a new 
category of online communication. These distinctions are one reason that 
no clear rule applicable to social networking hearsay has been 
established.173 The Supreme Court’s holding in Janus Capital Group, Inc. 
v. First Derivative Traders174 increased the uncertainty surrounding the 
admissibility of these different forms of online hearsay.175 
C. The Impact of Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders 
1. The Court’s Opinion 
Janus involved an action for violation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Rule 10b-5.176 This rule “prohibits ‘mak[ing] any untrue 
statement of a material fact’ in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.”177 Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG), a publicly-traded mutual 
fund manager, organized its mutual funds into a business trust entitled the 
Janus Investment Fund (JIF), a separate legal entity owned by 
shareholders.178 The controversy in Janus arose after the shareholder-
                                                                                                                 
 171. Id. at 438 n.3; see supra note 8. 
 172. See Primates on Facebook, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 26th, 2009), http://www. 
economist.com/node/13176775?story_id=13176775. 
 173. Cf. Minotti, supra note 163, at 1057, 1059 (noting the absence of a clear rule for 
social media, as well as the presence of “complicated discovery requests and unique 
admissibility hurdles” presented by the “latest Internet developments”). 
 174. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 175. See Gregory P. Joseph, Internet and Email Evidence (Part 1), PRAC. LAW., Feb. 
2012, at 19, 29 [hereinafter Joseph, Internet Evidence] (noting that in light of Janus, “the 
fact that a litigant posts on its website material from another website may not constitute an 
admission as to the contents of the second website, depending on the purpose of the 
posting”); Gregory P. Joseph, Supreme Court on Civil Practice 2011, 80 U.S.L.W. 250, 251 
(Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Joseph, Supreme Court 2011]. 
 176. 131 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 177. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010)). 
 178. Id. 
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owners of JIF hired JCG’s wholly owned subsidiary, Janus Capital 
Management LLC (JCM), to advise and administer JIF’s investments.179 At 
issue in the case were prospectuses issued by JIF “describing the 
investment strategy and operations of its mutual funds to investors.”180 JCG 
shareholders sued both JCG and JCM, alleging that prospectuses issued by 
JIF materially misled the public in violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 and that 
JCM was responsible because it advised JIF to issue those statements.181 
After concluding that, “[f]or purposes of [SEC] Rule 10b-5, the maker of a 
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement,” 
the Court found that JIF was responsible for making the statements because 
it filed the prospectuses with the SEC, regardless of the fact that JCM may 
have advised JIF on the contents of the statements.182 
In holding for JCG, the Court also rejected the shareholders’ argument 
that JCM made the misleading statements by hosting JIF’s prospectuses on 
its website.183 The Court found that “[m]erely hosting a document on a Web 
site does not indicate that the hosting entity adopts the document as its own 
statement.”184 In hosting JIF’s prospectuses, JCM did not “make” any of the 
statements found in those documents, just as the SEC does not “make” any 
of the statements found in documents hosted on its website.185 Ultimately, 
the Court held “that only a speaker or person with ultimate authority for 
content of an allegedly fraudulent statement may be held liable for damages 
under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 for ‘making’ the 
statement.”186 
2. Possible Impact of Janus on the Application of FRE 801(d)(2) to 
Online Statements 
Hearsay is not directly addressed in Janus.187 The Court’s holding was 
primarily a substantive one relating to the charged securities fraud.188 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 2300. 
 181. Id. at 2300-01. First Derivative Traders argued that, as the parent company of JCM, 
“JCG should be held liable for the acts of JCM as a ‘controlling person.’” Id. at 2301 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (Supp. V 2011)). 
 182. Id. at 2302, 2304. 
 183. Id. at 2305 n.12. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251. 
 187. Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court addressed a securities-specific issue . . . .”); see Janus 
Capital Grp. Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296. 
 188. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251. 
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However, the Court’s determination that hosting documents on a website is 
not equivalent to the host adopting the content of those documents may 
influence evidentiary rulings regarding the admissions doctrine and online 
statements. “Janus teaches that, depending on the circumstances, the fact 
that a litigant posts on its website material from another source may not 
constitute an adoption of the contents of the posted material.”189 This case 
raises questions about the application of FRE 801(d)(2), particularly in the 
context of adoptive admissions. 
While the ruling centered on who was ultimately responsible for the 
prospectuses, the Court explicitly addressed the question of whether JCM 
“adopt[ed] the document[s] as its own statement,” and ruled that hosting did 
not constitute making a statement.190 When considering the Court’s holding 
in the context of FRE 801(d)(2)(B), the implication is that JCM’s hosting of 
documents may not have been a “statement” for hearsay purposes191 or, in 
the alternative, that merely hosting documents on a website is insufficient to 
manifest adoption or a belief in the truth of those documents.192 
Janus highlighted the difficulties courts experience when determining 
whether a statement was made online. Under similar facts in Van 
Westrienen, the District of Oregon held that fraudulent statements were 
made when “a wealth of misinformation” was placed by a defendant-debt 
collections company on its website and admitted those statements under 
FRE 801(d)(2).193 The TIP Systems court also admitted statements from a 
website under FRE 801(d)(2) because it found the statements to have been 
made by the party.194 In both cases, information on a party’s website was 
found to be a statement; yet, in Janus, the Court found no statement had 
been made when JCM hosted documents on its website.195 
In addition, the Court’s analysis in Janus raises questions about online 
adoption of another’s statements.196 Courts have recognized adoption in 
cases where individuals have forwarded emails, so long as there was 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Id. 
 190. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302, 2304, 2305 n.12. 
 191. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion, written 
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.”). 
 192. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(B). 
 193. Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 
(D. Or. 2000). 
 194. TIP Sys., LLC v. SBC Operations, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 756 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 
2008). 
 195. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.12, with TIP Sys., LLC, 536 
F. Supp. 2d at 756 n.5, and Van Westrienen, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. 
 196. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251. 
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sufficient manifestation of the forwarder’s adoption or belief in the truth of 
the original message.197 When forwarding an email, the forwarder typically 
takes a message created by another and relays that message from his email 
account. This process is analogous to linking or hosting another’s document 
on a website; in the hosting context, the host places another’s content in an 
area the host controls. Yet in Janus, the hosting conduct was not given the 
same treatment applied by other courts to email adoptions.198 The Court’s 
grounds for this distinction are not exceptionally clear, likely due to the 
ancillary nature of this particular inquiry to the case; but, as the Safavian 
court found in the email context, without clear demonstration of intent to 
adopt, there is no adoption.199 
While the Janus Court did not speak explicitly in the context of hearsay 
or FRE 801(d)(2), the holding implicates evidentiary concerns.200 The 
Court’s restrictive view of Internet statements and adoptions in the online 
context contrasts with several lower court opinions that permit such 
evidence as non-hearsay admissions.201 The limited federal case law on the 
issue, the absence of clear admissibility rules, the silence of the FRE 
regarding online hearsay, and the Janus holding all point to the necessity of 
considering the implications of Internet communications on FRE 801(d)(2), 
and what approaches could be taken to address these uncertainties. 
IV. Impact of Changes in Online Communication Technologies on the 
Applicability of FRE 801(d)(2) to Online Statements 
The two primary issues concerning the application of FRE 801(d)(2) to 
Internet activity are: (1) defining what online conduct constitutes a 
statement for hearsay purposes and (2) deciding how to determine what is 
sufficient to indicate adoption of statements online. The development of 
Internet technology has already prompted numerous discussions regarding 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 198. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.12, with Safavian, 435 F. 
Supp. 2d at 43. 
 199. See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
 200. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251. 
 201. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305 (finding no statement made 
for purposes of fraud on party’s website), with United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 
152, 162 (D. Me. 2011) (discussing that possession of child pornography on a party’s 
computer could be an admission of committing the crime of possession), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part on other grounds, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012), and TIP Sys., LLC v. SBC 
Operations, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 756 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that a statement 
had been made by the party on its website that constituted an admission). 
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the general admissibility of online evidence.202 However, in light of the 
expanding ability of individuals to contribute to online communities and the 
resulting new forms of statements, further consideration of FRE 801(d)(2) 
is required. 
A. The Proliferation of Internet Use and Its Effect on Hearsay Evidence 
The proliferation of Internet use will undoubtedly lead to a surge in 
attempts to use electronic evidence. The Internet is used in connection with 
business transactions and, increasingly, with social relationships. One area 
of major growth in online activity is in social networking: “The world has 
embraced social networking with a fervor rarely seen.”203 As of December 
2012, one billion people were considered “active users” of Facebook, with 
over half of those users logging on every day,204 and Twitter had 200 
million monthly active users.205 With online conduct occurring at such a 
high rate, there is an increasing probability that Internet content will come 
under courts’ scrutiny. 
A number of recent cases illustrate the impact of wide Internet use on 
litigation.206 This effect is strong in the evidentiary context “as social 
networking sites so often offer up gold nuggets of evidence.”207 Cross-
examination was permitted regarding a Facebook profile, a personal injury 
claim was called into question because of photos indicating physical fitness, 
a child-custody battle was lost due to inappropriate online posts, and a 
husband’s position in a divorce case was compromised by a profile post 
stating he was single.208 
Online statements are also utilized in criminal prosecutions.209 Internet 
profiles repeatedly cause increases in lengths of criminal sentences when 
they show convicted persons being unremorseful.210 In addition, “police 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See, e.g., Frieden & Murray, supra note 11; Goode, supra note 10; Joseph, Internet 
Evidence, supra note 175. 
 203. Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2009-2010). 
 204. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsArea 
Id=22 (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). Approximately 82% of “monthly active users are located 
outside the U.S. and Canada.” Id. 
 205. @twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/twitter/status/281051652235087872 (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 206. See generally Nelson et al., supra note 203. 
 207. Id. at 11. 
 208. Id. at 11-13 (summarizing cases). 
 209. Id. at 12. 
 210. See id. at 12-13. 
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often use social networking sites in their investigations.”211 In one case, a 
witness identified a first-degree murder suspect through a photograph 
posted online; additionally, police have used fake names to collect evidence 
from possible criminals.212 
These examples illustrate the impact of increased Internet use in the legal 
field. As a result, the uncertainty regarding admissibility of online hearsay 
is a pressing issue.213 Indeed, “[s]ocial networking has often outpaced . . . 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,”214 including FRE 
801(d)(2); the changes in Internet use increase the need to reexamine how 
FRE 801(d)(2) applies to online hearsay. 
B. The Increased Outlets for Making Online Statements 
The hearsay rule is concerned with out-of-court statements, and online 
statements are certainly ones made outside a courtroom.215 The value of 
social networking can be found in the “new ways to communicate and share 
information” that these sites create.216 Implicit in this new form of 
communication is a new method of making statements online, and Web 2.0 
has given this ability to the general public.217 Facebook allows individuals 
to make online posts, upload photos, share links, and “like” posts.218 Twitter 
allows individuals to post “tweets” consisting of 140 characters or less to 
share information.219 Twitter also allows users to “retweet” another user’s 
posts, which effectively re-posts what the other user posted on the 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Id. at 13. 
 212. Vesna Jaksic, Litigation Clues Are Found on Facebook, NAT’L L.J. (N.Y.C.), Oct. 
15, 2007, at 1, available at http://vesnajaksic.com/?page_id=35. 
 213. Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal 
Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 373 (2010) (“As the legal field grapples with 
the growth and prevalence of social networking, there do not yet seem to be bright lines 
clarifying the legal issues involved and social networking often outpaces and changes the 
law itself.”). 
 214. Id. at 373 n.70. 
 215. See FED. R. EVID. 802; Goode, supra note 10 (“[E]lectronic evidence clearly 
originates out-of-court . . . .”). 
 216. See Vinson, supra note 213, at 356 n.2. 
 217. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 218. See How to Post & Share, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/13237 
1443506290/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013); Like, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
110920455663362/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 219. About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
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“retweeting” user’s profile.220 The “retweet” feature and the ability to post 
links or “like” posts on a Facebook page implicate the adopted statements 
provision in FRE 801(d)(2)(B). 
While some instances of online postings may present obvious statements 
for hearsay purposes, such as a party authoring an email or posting his own 
statement on his own website,221 there are many other circumstances where 
the line is unclear. When an individual shares a link on Facebook, “likes” 
another’s post, or “retweets” another’s post on Twitter, the admissibility of 
that out-of-court statement will depend on whether a court treats that act as 
“making” a statement, adopting a statement, or neither. The Supreme 
Court’s holding in Janus illustrates that “[p]osting, alone, may be 
insufficient to manifest adoption.”222 
While “lawyers [are] always slower than the general public to adopt new 
technology,”223 justice requires development of an even and defined process 
for determining the admissibility of online hearsay under FRE 801(d)(2). 
The current state of the law in this area threatens uneven application of FRE 
801(d)(2) in online circumstances. Several approaches could be undertaken 
to ensure consistent application of FRE 801(d)(2) to online hearsay. 
C. Approaches to Applying FRE 801(d)(2) to Online Communications 
Developing Internet-communication technologies have raised two issues 
as to admissibility of online statements under FRE 801(d)(2). First, there is 
ambiguity in identifying what constitutes a statement in the online context. 
This question is often raised in courts’ evaluation of admissibility,224 yet no 
clear answer has emerged. Under the current definition of a statement in the 
FRE, a court must determine whether there was an “oral assertion, written 
assertion, or nonverbal conduct . . . intended [to be] an assertion.”225 This 
analysis becomes muddled when applied to new forms of online 
statements.226 Going forward, the evidentiary analysis relating to Internet 
hearsay and FRE 801(d)(2) should take into account the distinction between 
                                                                                                                 
 220. FAQs About Retweets (RT), TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-
basics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/77606-what-is-retweet-rt (last visited Mar. 10, 
2013). 
 221. See supra Part III.B. 
 222. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251. 
 223. Nelson et al., supra note 203, at 1. 
 224. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007). 
 225. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 226. Moore, supra note 9, at 168 (citing RICE, supra note 21, at 403). 
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clear statements such as emails and online conduct not as easily defined as 
an assertion. 
Once an effective definition of an online statement is settled on, the 
second issue to be addressed is determining when an individual has, in fact, 
made or adopted an online statement for purposes of the admissions 
doctrine. While the Supreme Court indicated that posting alone might not 
suffice to indicate adoption, it offered no direct guidance as to when an 
online statement is made or adopted.227 The admissibility of online hearsay 
can be properly evaluated only when both the definition of an Internet 
statement is settled and the point at which an online statement has been 
made or adopted is articulated. 
One way to handle the new challenges posed by the proliferation of 
Internet use and the resulting online-hearsay implications is to maintain the 
status quo by liberally interpreting the existing FRE when applying them to 
online statements.228 Another approach is to amend the FRE to 
accommodate the changing environment.229 
1. Option One: Maintaining the Status Quo by Applying the Current 
Rules to Online Situations 
When determining the admissibility of online evidence, some courts 
have simply applied the existing FRE.230 In such cases, courts have not seen 
a significant difference between online statements and traditional 
statements in their admissibility, and have simply applied the existing 
hearsay rules.231 In the context of FRE 801(d)(2), this approach is widely 
used when dealing with emails.232 As a form of communication, emails are 
analogous to older practices such as letter-writing or one-on-one 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Cf. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 (2011) 
(finding an online posting was not a statement for purposes of securities fraud). 
 228. See Moore, supra note 9, at 168 (noting that some courts “recognize how 
commonplace electronic information is and . . . liberally interpret the hearsay rules to ensure 
its admissibility”). 
 229. Cf. id. at 186 (arguing for amendment of the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule). 
 230. See id. at 168. 
 231. See Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 n.2 
(S.D. Iowa 2000) (admitting emails under FRE 803(3) as statements of declarant’s then-
existing mental, emotional, or physical condition), aff’d, 238 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2001); Van 
Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (D. Or. 2000) 
(admitting online statements as admissions of a party opponent); State v. Erickstad, 2000 
ND 202, ¶¶ 32-34, 620 N.W. 2d 136, 145 (admitting online used car price guide under a 
market report or commercial publication exception to hearsay rule). 
 232. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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conversing; thus, courts have little difficulty applying the current FRE to 
this type of online statement.233 
This approach is supported in a number of legal commentaries.234 In The 
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, Professor Steven Goode argues “that 
the current framework provided by the rules of evidence is adequate to the 
task” of accommodating electronic evidence.235 Professor Goode notes that 
despite the FRE being drafted “in the 1960s, well before computers, e-mail, 
the internet, and digital cameras became commonplace in American life,” 
they surprisingly “provide a fairly good evidentiary framework for 
addressing the admissibility issues raised by the proliferation of new 
technologies.”236 To support his conclusion, Professor Goode first provides 
insight into courts’ “predictable pattern” when evaluating the admissibility 
of evidence generated through new technology, noting historic examples of 
“initial judicial intransigence eventually yield[ing] to grudging acceptance” 
and ultimately resulting in courts’ comfort with admissibility.237 To 
illustrate this pattern playing out with Internet evidence, Professor Goode 
points to the “judicial recalcitrance” exhibited by the St. Clair court and the 
less antagonistic approach of other courts, concluding that “admissibility 
decisions concerning this type of evidence will follow the same trajectory” 
as those of the past.238 
Regarding hearsay, Professor Goode argues that the “issues that arise in 
connection with electronic evidence are much simpler” and the analysis 
should function in the same way as it does with other out-of-court 
statements.239 After pointing to the frequent use of FRE 801(d)(2) to admit 
Internet evidence, attention is drawn to the ambiguity surrounding who 
makes or adopts statements online; Professor Goode advises that “[c]ontext 
                                                                                                                 
 233. See id. 
 234. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 10, at 43; Joseph, Internet Evidence, supra note 175, at 
19. 
 235. Goode, supra note 10, at 2. 
 236. Id. at 2-3. 
 237. Id. at 4. Professor Goode outlines courts’ initial reluctance to accept photographs, 
recorded conversations, and motion pictures based both on concerns for inaccurate or 
misleading evidence and on the absence of applicable case law dealing with those 
technologies. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Fair Haven & Westville R.R., 43 A. 1047, 1049 
(Conn. 1899); State v. Simon, 174 A. 867, 872 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1934), aff’d, 178 A. 728 (N.J. 
1935); JORDAN S. GRUBER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE § 8:1 (1995)). 
 238. Id. at 5-6. 
 239. Id. at 42. Using email as an example, Professor Goode asserts that the hearsay 
analysis is no different from that of a handwritten or typed letter. Id. at 42-43. 
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will often be important in determining whether” a statement has been made 
or adopted on a website.240 
In another commentary supporting application of the current FRE, 
Gregory P. Joseph acknowledges the changes brought about by the Internet: 
“The explosive growth of the Internet, electronic mail, text messaging, and 
social networks is raising a series of novel evidentiary issues.”241 Joseph’s 
response is to point out that “[t]he novelty of the evidentiary issues arises 
out of the novelty of the media—thus, it is essentially factual,” as opposed 
to legal, novelty.242 In light of this distinction, Joseph argues that any issues 
raised by Internet evidence “can be resolved by relatively straightforward 
application of existing principles in a fashion very similar to the way they 
are applied to other computer-generated evidence and to more traditional 
exhibits.”243 With regard to FRE 801(d)(2), Joseph states that “[w]ebsite 
data published by a litigant comprise admissions of that litigant when 
offered by an opponent.”244 Joseph seems to agree with Professor Goode’s 
propositions that the current FRE provide the necessary tools to evaluate 
the admissibility of Internet hearsay and that, as a result, the current 
evidentiary regime should be maintained.245 
Applying the current rules to newly emerging technology also finds 
support in the FRE themselves. Specific to the issue of defining a statement 
online, the advisory committee’s notes to FRE 801(a) may provide 
guidance: “The key to the [‘statement’] definition is that nothing is an 
assertion unless intended to be one.”246 Under the advisory committee’s 
current interpretation of the rules, “all evidence of conduct, verbal or 
nonverbal, not intended as an assertion” is excluded.247 As to adoption 
online, the text of FRE 801(d)(2)(B) specifically references a manifestation 
of intent to adopt.248 Thus, FRE 801 may provide sufficient guidance for 
application of the existing rules to online situations, so long as the “factual 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at 45-47. 
 241. Joseph, Internet Evidence, supra note 175, at 19. 
 242. Id. Joseph notes that “[t]he applicable legal principles are familiar—[electronic] 
evidence must be authenticated and, to the extent offered for its truth, it must satisfy hearsay 
concerns.” Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 29. 
 245. Compare id. at 19, with Goode, supra note 10, at 43. 
 246. FED R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s notes. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(B). 
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novelty” identified by Joseph249 does not cause deviation from the rules’ 
traditional applications.250 
In addition, FRE 102, which outlines the purpose of the rules, advises 
that “[t]hese rules should be construed so as to . . . promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.”251 One commentator on the general nature of 
the rules observed: “[T]he drafters intended that the Federal Rules’ 
generality and flexibility should perpetuate. . . . [T]he Advisory Committee 
intended to give trial courts the maneuverability to craft [their] rulings to do 
individual justice.”252 Part of the flexibility entrenched in the rules is “the 
unique position of the trial judge, who observes the context in which 
particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position 
to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of 
particular evidence.”253 When applying these flexibility principles in the 
context of the Internet and FRE 801(d)(2), the rules contemplate that trial 
judges will be able to overcome difficult admissibility questions by 
applying the general policies of truth-seeking and justice.254 
Inherent in the rules’ flexibility, however, is a possibility of 
inconsistency in application.255 Because of the general phrasing of the rules, 
“[I]t is sometimes hard to predict just how much proof a particular judge 
will require to admit a particular piece of electronic evidence.”256 Some 
courts have struggled with applying the current rules to online situations.257 
In light of Janus, there is a possibility that these struggles may increase. 
While the Van Westrienen court applied the current rules to admit webpage 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Joseph, Internet Evidence, supra note 175, at 19. 
 250. See Goode, supra note 10, at 45-47. 
 251. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 252. Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 
IOWA L. REV. 413, 457-58 (1989) (footnote omitted) (“The Committee was comprised of 
former and practicing trial lawyers who understood the nature of jury trials and believed that 
drafting acceptable specific rules to answer most evidence questions was impossible.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 253. David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 
937, 956-57 (1990). 
 254. See FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 255. See Goode, supra note 10, at 6-7. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 n.6 (D. Me. 2011) 
(noting that classifying conduct under existing rules is difficult), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
on other grounds, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 
534, 564 (D. Md. 2007) (discussing the difficulty in determining whether online posts are 
statements for hearsay purposes). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
564 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:533 
 
 
postings as statements of an opposing party, the Supreme Court found that 
no statement was made by hosting documents online.258 Further, applying 
the current rules may become even more difficult as new technologies 
emerge.259 These new situations cause judges “to resolve evidentiary 
concerns in contexts they have not seen before.”260 Professor Goode 
explains that courts have been faced with this difficulty before and 
satisfactory solutions have nonetheless emerged;261 but these solutions, at 
least in light of defining online statements and adoptions, have yet to come 
into clear focus. 
With the flexibility of the rules as designed, the questions of what online 
conduct constitutes a statement for hearsay purposes, and what is sufficient 
for adoption online, remain somewhat unanswered. If this approach is 
adopted going forward, it must be premised on the assumption that courts 
will adapt to new technologies and develop clear and uniform admissibility 
rules for new Internet hearsay. 
2. Option Two: Amending the FRE to Accommodate Internet 
Communications 
Another approach to solving the new issues presented by online hearsay 
is to amend the FRE.262 In Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored 
Information in Civil Litigation, Jonathan L. Moore begins by observing that 
there have been no changes to the FRE in response to ESI, while the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) have been amended to address 
concerns over e-discovery.263 Moore prefaces his argument by detailing the 
“vast technological and societal changes” brought on by the increased 
influence of computer technology.264 Moore argues that, in the absence of 
                                                                                                                 
 258. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.C. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 n.12 (2011), with Van Westrienen v. Americontinental 
Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093, 1109 (D. Or. 2000) (illustrating contrasting 
results in evaluations of online postings as statements).  
 259. See RICE, supra note 21, at 492. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Goode, supra note 10, at 4; see supra note 237. 
 262. Moore, supra note 9, at 186. 
 263. Id. at 147. 
 264. Id. at 147-48. “The changes brought by this technology pervade all aspects of 
modern life, ‘chang[ing] almost everything about our relationship with information: how we 
create it, how much of it we create, how it is stored, who sees it, [and] how and when we 
dispose of it.’” Id. at 148 (alterations in original) (quoting James Gibson, A Topic Both 
Timely and Timeless, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 49, ¶ 2 (2004)). 
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relevant changes to the FRE, “[F]ederal courts have used vastly differing 
admissibility standards” when dealing with electronic evidence; thus, 
amendments to the FRE are necessary “to provide clarity and 
uniformity.”265 While pointing out that the existing FRE “are flexible 
enough to accommodate the changes brought by ESI,”266 Moore ultimately 
concludes amendments are necessary: 
Even with this flexibility, some of the changes wrought by 
technology have no common law analog, making it difficult for 
judges to resolve them. Additionally, the current rules are 
premised on the concept of written, physical evidence, a concept 
that technological changes have significantly altered in the new 
millennium. These changes necessitate the reconsideration of the 
traditional rules of evidence.267 
In his article, Moore provides textual changes to a number of rules, but 
does not directly address changes to FRE 801(d)(2).268 However, his 
observations regarding the sweeping societal changes brought on by 
technology, and the accompanying judicial uncertainty,269 are equally 
present with regard to FRE 801(d)(2).270 Thus, his suggestion of 
amendment may still be applicable. 
As Moore observes, amending federal rules to accommodate technology 
is not unprecedented.271 In 2006, the FRCP were amended in response to 
increasing concerns over the discoverability of ESI.272 The primary issues 
surrounding electronic discovery prior to the 2006 FRCP were the sheer 
volume of ESI and the resulting increase in the cost of litigation.273 The 
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inherent characteristics of ESI contributed to the burdens on the litigation 
system: ESI is (1) “dynamic” in that it can be easily modified, (2) 
“persistent” because attempts to destroy it can often be undone, (3) 
“dependent upon the technology that created it,” and (4) available in many 
different forms, making discovery difficult.274 
The burdens of ESI discovery on the efficiency and cost of litigation 
directly conflicted with FRCP 1, which requires that the FRCP “‘be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.’”275 Without clear guidance from procedural 
rules, courts applied local rules and case law, rather than meeting the 
mandate of FRCP 1; this led to inconsistent results “and a confusing and 
debilitating federal civil judicial system.”276 
In response, “the Advisory Committee first proposed the Amendments 
‘to reduce the costs of [electronic] discovery, to increase [discovery’s] 
efficiency, to increase uniformity of practice, and to encourage the judiciary 
to participate more actively in case management.’”277 Further, “[t]he 
Advisory Committee solicited extensive input from ‘bar organizations, 
attorneys, computer specialists, and members of the public,’”278 and 
concluded that amendment of the FRCP was needed because, without 
uniform rules, “a patchwork of rules and requirements [was] likely to 
develop” in courts across the country.279 Without top-down change “to 
accommodate the distinctive features of electronic discovery . . . similarly 
situated litigants will . . . be treated differently depending on the federal 
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forum.”280 Upon approval by the Supreme Court, the amendments were 
incorporated in 2006.281 
The substantive changes to the discovery rules included, among others, 
defining ESI as discoverable information, limiting the discoverability of 
certain sources of ESI absent good cause, defining appropriate formats for 
the delivery of ESI, and establishing who pays for electronic discovery.282 
The 2006 amendments focused the scope of discovery by requiring 
discovering parties “to consider the evidence they need, where it is located, 
and how to acquire it in a way that is fair and proportional to the needs of 
the case.”283 The burden imposed by vast quantities of available information 
was mitigated under the 2006 amendments because parties are now 
encouraged “to seek only the information that is necessary for the 
resolution of the case.”284 As a result, courts and attorneys are becoming 
“increasingly adept at using the tools the Amendments provide to craft 
discovery protocols that are reasonable, iterative, and proportional to the 
needs of the case,” thus meeting FRCP 1’s call for speedy and inexpensive 
litigation.285 
If amending the FRE to address changes brought on by Internet evidence 
is an appropriate response, the process and reasoning by which the FRCP 
were amended would provide valuable guidance. However, no concrete 
proposals to amend FRE 801(d)(2) have emerged to address the issues of 
what online conduct constitutes a statement for hearsay purposes and when 
an online statement has been adopted. Given the explicit purpose of the 
FRE and the expectancy by the drafters that the rules would remain general 
and flexible,286 it is difficult to imagine creating particular rules to define 
what online conduct constitutes a statement or at what point an adoption has 
been made online. To answer these questions in the text of a rule, 
amendments would have to be extremely issue specific, which would 
contravene the rules’ underlying policy of adaptability. Adding additional 
Internet-specific hearsay rules may conflict with the recent streamlining 
amendments to the FRE. 
                                                                                                                 
 280. Id. at 24. 
 281. Borden et al., supra note 272, ¶ 6. 
 282. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in 
Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 521 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), 
34(a)(1)(A), 34(b)(1)(C), (2)(E); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes). 
 283. See Borden et al., supra note 272, ¶ 10. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. ¶ 11. 
 286. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
568 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:533 
 
 
While amending the FRE might provide a more concrete answer to the 
admissibility issues presented by Internet hearsay, doing so may directly 
conflict with the designed adaptability of the rules. While, in the short-term, 
amending the FRE may provide a clear and concise definition of an online 
statement or adoption, any such change could become obsolete with further 
technological advancement. Amending the FRE to reflect the current state 
of technology could lead to an endless stream of changes that would 
ultimately lead to more confusion in the future. 
D. The Appropriateness, Despite Technological Change, of Maintaining the 
Current Approach to FRE 801(d)(2) 
1. Sufficiency of the Evidentiary Status Quo to Developing Adequate 
Definitions Applicable to Online Conduct and FRE 801(d)(2) 
The expansion of online communication methods is particularly 
impactful with regard to the hearsay rule and the admissions doctrine.287 As 
one court pointed out, “Given the near universal use of electronic means of 
communication, it is not surprising that statements contained in 
electronically made or stored evidence often have been found to qualify as 
admissions by a party opponent.”288 Because this new type of evidence 
proves apt for application of FRE 801(d)(2), these technological changes 
require important consideration. 
Ultimately, maintaining the evidentiary status quo by liberally 
interpreting existing rules in the case of Internet statements provides the 
most efficient and satisfactory response to new admissibility concerns. As 
history has shown, the FRE were designed to be flexible to new 
technological changes. Thus, amending them to adapt to new technology 
would contravene their stated purpose. 
Professor Goode’s explanation of courts’ past responses to technological 
change provides compelling support to the proposition that any current 
difficulty with the admissibility of Internet evidence may be relatively 
short-lived.289 While the current definition for what online conduct 
constitutes a statement for hearsay purposes may be unclear to courts, FRE 
801 provides sufficient guidance to eventually develop such a definition. 
The key is whether the online conduct was intended as an assertion. For 
adoptions, the online conduct must manifest belief in the truth of the 
adopted statement. While Janus may have clouded the issue of online 
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adoptions, the Court’s decision still reflects the spirit of FRE 801(d)(2)(B): 
“Posting, alone, may be insufficient to manifest adoption.”290 Rule 
801(d)(2)(B) supports this conclusion by requiring not only posting, but 
also clearly indicated intent to adopt. Courts today may struggle with how 
to determine such intent, but history shows that as technology becomes 
more familiar, admissibility rules will catch up. 
While “[t]he evidentiary issues posed by electronically stored 
information may be difficult to resolve effectively,”291 undertaking the 
effort to apply the existing rules is preferable to attempts to amend the rules 
to reflect the current state of technology. There is little doubt that new 
forms of Internet communication, or other forms of technology not yet 
imagined, will soon emerge. Amending the FRE would result in at best a 
temporary answer and at worst a constantly changing set of rules. The best 
method to resolve admissibility issues under FRE 801(d)(2) in the Internet 
age is to apply well-defined admissibility doctrines, thus furthering the 
flexibility of the FRE. 
2. Accelerating the Process of Resolving Internet Hearsay Admissibility 
Issues Through Education 
As Joseph notes, the admissibility issues courts have struggled with in 
applying FRE 801(d)(2) to Internet evidence reflect factual novelty, not 
unclear legal standards.292 Indeed, the traditional operation of FRE 
801(d)(2) has been clearly established.293 Yet courts dealing with newly 
emerging Internet evidence seemed weary of accepting the evidentiary 
value of online content.294 This reflects the pattern of initial reluctance 
Professor Goode identified; thus, as history tells us, the solution to any 
admissibility issue can be found through greater understanding and 
acceptance of, in this case, Internet technology.295 
Given the increasing importance of Internet evidence in litigation,296 it is 
appropriate to implement educational measures to familiarize attorneys and 
judges with new forms of Internet communication. These technologies 
present vast opportunities for nearly anyone to generate out-of-court 
statements; thus, it will be helpful for judicial officers to be aware of some 
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of the intricacies involved. Specifically, they should receive instruction on 
how users of specific technologies communicate with each other, how 
profiles are organized, and how to evaluate the context of posts on a given 
platform. Because of the services’ overwhelming popularity, Facebook and 
Twitter instruction should feature prominently.297 To maintain effectiveness 
in the future, this educational process should be revisited from time to time 
to address any developments in technology. As the Cameron court 
indicated, Internet technology and hearsay must be periodically reevaluated 
to ensure proper evidentiary determinations are made.298 
By instituting educational efforts to familiarize judges and lawyers with 
new sources of out-of-court statements, hearsay determinations under the 
existing FRE will be made with more consistency and clarity. The current 
rules are “adequate to the task” of accommodating electronic evidence.299 
All that is needed to resolve uncertainty surrounding online statements is to 
provide courts with sufficient understandings of the underlying technology 
to apply the current, well-defined legal standards for the admissibility of 
online hearsay. 
V. Conclusion 
The dawning of the Internet age has had a resounding effect in the legal 
world. The presence of ESI has caused sweeping changes to the way 
lawyers practice. This new form of evidence has already led to the 
amendment of the FRCP. The more recent proliferation of online avenues 
of communication implicates concerns for the applicability of the current 
FRE in the context of hearsay and the admissions doctrine. While it is clear 
that the current FRE govern online evidence in the same way they govern 
all other types of evidence, this comment attempts to point out the 
difficulties presented by Internet communication and the application of 
FRE 801(d)(2). 
When examining the existing jurisprudential applications of the current 
FRE to online situations, it might seem that courts have had little trouble 
adapting. Despite early reluctance to accept online evidence, courts have 
increasingly found online out-of-court statements admissible under the 
current exceptions to the hearsay doctrine. Further, courts often apply FRE 
801(d)(2) to admit online statements as non-hearsay. Case law has clearly 
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established email to be an acceptable form of non-hearsay admission, and 
courts also have routinely applied the admissions doctrine to other types of 
online content, albeit with more difficulty. 
The issues in application of the current FRE emerge when dealing with 
new forms of online communication that do not present neat analogies to 
pre-Internet evidence. While an email can be easily compared to a physical 
letter, content generated through website postings, social networks, and 
other non-email online mediums does not readily lend itself to such 
comparison. These issues are particularly relevant due to the proliferation 
of such new outlets. Despite near ubiquitous use of social media, no clear 
rule concerning the admissibility of this type of evidence has emerged. This 
speaks to the difficulty presented in applying the current FRE in the online 
context. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders has also called into question the applicability of the 
current FRE to online out-of-court statements. 
The result leaves uncertain both the definition of an online statement and 
the point at which such a statement has been made. To resolve this 
uncertainty, there are two possible approaches: maintaining the status quo 
by continuing to apply the current rules or evaluating the possibility of 
amending the FRE to accommodate online conduct. Amending the FRE is 
not a satisfactory solution. Adding another rule, particularly one as specific 
as would be required to address changing technology, would complicate the 
FRE and conflict with recent simplification and streamlining efforts. Also, 
no change could account for future developments in Internet technology. 
Because of the rapid expansion seen in the last ten years, a new rule 
addressing today’s concerns would almost certainly be outdated in the near 
future. 
Despite the changes in outlets for out-of-court statements, the current 
FRE remain adequate to determine the admissibility of hearsay as the 
statement of an opposing party. Every evidentiary determination requires a 
fact-intensive analysis, factoring in the form, context, and meaning of the 
evidence. In evaluating the admissibility of Internet evidence in the 
admissions context, this same fact-intensive analysis will be required. 
While technological changes make this analysis more complicated and 
nuanced, amending the rules is unwarranted. Keeping the current rules 
intact while updating courts’ and attorneys’ understandings of technology 
will adequately address the present and future difficulties in the application 
of the admissions doctrine to online statements. 
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